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Abstract
     The recent battle reported from Washington about proposed national testing program
does not tell the most important political story about high stakes tests. Politically popular
school accountability systems in many states already revolve around statistical results of
testing with high-stakes environments. The future of high stakes tests thus does not depend
on what happens on Capitol Hill. Rather, the existence of tests depends largely on the
political culture of published test results. Most critics of high-stakes testing do not talk about
that culture, however. They typically focus on the practice legacy of testing, the ways in 
which testing creates perverse incentives against good teaching. More important may be the
political legacy, or how testing defines legitimate discussion about school politics. The
consequence of statistical accountability systems will be the narrowing of purpose for
schools, impatience with reform, and the continuing erosion of political support for publicly
funded schools. Dissent from the high-stakes accountability regime that has developed
around standardized testing, including proposals for professionalism and performance
assessment, commonly fails to consider these political legacies. Alternatives to standardized
testing which do not also connect schooling with the public at large will not be politically
viable. 
Introduction
     The short-term question about high-stakes testing is not whether it shall prevail but who
shall control it. The president of the United States advocates the use of standardized testing
developed by the federal government. (Note 1. Opens in separate browser window.)
Conservatives who vigorously oppose nationalized curriculum and testing agree that testing
should exist, but organized on a state and local level instead (see Diegmueller and Lawton
1996; Lawton 1997). The recent compromise between Rep. William Goodling and the
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White House left the long-term fate of a truly national testing program unresolved (Hoff
1997). Nonetheless, what is not at stake is the existence of high-stakes testing. Recent
polling suggests that the idea of national testing is very popular (Rose, Gallup and Elam
1997), and that popularity reflects the past twenty years' growth of standardized testing. The
debate over the control of testing takes for granted the existence of standardized testing
because of its recent history. States for many years have been accumulating testing
requirements which their legislatures, state officials, or local administrators have chosen.
Despite considerable evidence that high-stakes testing distorts teaching and does not give
very stable information about school performance, test results have become the dominant
way states, politicians, and newspapers describe the performance of schools. Some have
continued to note the problems of high-stakes standardized testing (e.g., Madaus 1991;
McGill-Franzen and Allington 1993; Neill 1996; Noble and Smith 1994; Shepard 1991;
Smith 1991; Smith and Rottenberg 1991; Wirth 1992: Chap. 7). Others try to accommodate
some measure of standardized testing while building what they see as safeguards against
obvious abuses. Still others (administrators in systems or schools with above-average test
scores) use results as part of a marketing or public relations strategy. Few critics of
high-stakes testing, however, have explicitly noted the way in which the public use of
accountability systems shapes the politics of education writ large. 
     Statistical accountability systems are important because numbers have visible power in
public debate. Anyone who listens to or reads politicians, journalists, and social critics will
hear statistical references. Slowly over the last century, statistics have taken a prominent
place in political culture. Whether the statistic is the official unemployment rate, poverty
rates, poll results, or SAT scores, a specific number fills a niche in discussion. As Carol
Weiss (1988: 168) wrote,
The media report the proportion of the population that has been out of work for
fifteen weeks or more, characteristics of high schools which have the highest
drop-out rates, reasons given by voters for choosing candidates. These kinds of
data become accessible and help to inform policy debates.
A number connotes objectivity or, at the very least, legitimacy. Because we perceive
numbers and statistics as having a certain force on its face (just by being quantitative), we
allow statistics to shape our perception of the world and the issues we perceive as important.
They present selective information and thus center discussion around specific topics
(silencing others). Nonetheless, we often yearn for the end of political uncertainty through
statistics. Partisans in a conflict may heatedly argue that their methods are better, or their
opponents' use of statistics is politically motivated, yet behind the veneer of cynicism lurks a
desire for unquestionable statistics that will end debate. Maybe the official poverty line is
arbitrary, but others have calculated alternative poverty estimates (Axinn and Stern 1988:
73-77; Ruggles 1990). The portrayal of a "rising tide of mediocrity" in schools was an
alleged lie, but then the critics presented their own statistics as counter-evidence (Berliner
and Biddle 1995; Bracey 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995a, 1996, 1997; National Commission
on Excellence in Education 1983).
     The production and presentation of statistics is part of the fabric of public debate, and
public policy that involves the heavy use of statistics must consider the long-term
consequences of that use. At least two such consequences are important, what I will call the
practice and political legacies of statistics. The distinction between the two revolves around
related but heuristically distinct issues:
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How do policies based on statistics shape practice?
How do policies based on statistics shape future public policy debate?
The practice legacy of statistics is the nuts and bolts of how statistics shape government and
private action. For example, the official U.S. consumer price index determines cost-of-living
indices for Social Security, government pay schedules, and the behavior of many private
organizations. Census population counts determine state representation in the U.S. House of
Representatives and some federal spending patterns. This practice legacy can, by itself,
engender vivid disagreement about statistical mechanisms. In 1997, several so-called deficit
hawks suggested changing the calculation of the consumer price index to lower
cost-of-living indices deliberately. While they claimed that the official inflation statistics
misrepresented the "true" amount of inflation, reporters and groups such as the United Auto
Workers clearly understood that the argument was not about the most accurate picture of
inflation but was, in large part, about the practice legacy of inflation statistics for the U.S.
federal budget, entitlement programs, and private company wages and benefits (e.g., "Will
Washington Cut Our COLA?" 1997). Similarly, debate about the conduct of the decennial
U.S. census in the past ten years has revolved not around accuracy but policy consequences.
If, as some have proposed, the Bureau of the Census augments its population count with
samples to measure undercounting and adjusts the official counts with the help of samples,
the distribution of federal aid to cities and states as well as Congressional representation will
change according to adjustment for undercounting. Politicians in jurisdictions with alleged
undercounting have an interest in supporting such adjustment based on sampling because
adjusted population counts would give their constituencies higher federal aid. Other
politicians have an equally intense incentive in opposing the use of sampling to prevent the
loss of federal aid (Mears 1997; Roush 1996). The practice legacy of statistics is an obvious
consequence of tying statistics to public policy. The examples above show specific practice
legacies, when statistics are mechanisms of what Paul Starr (1987: 55-57) calls "automatic
pilots." They may be less obvious in the creation of systems of incentives, as some argue
that high-stakes testing environments create. Whether the result is from explicit formulae or
a consequence of incentives, a practice legacy is the influence of policy on short-term
behavior. 
     What is less clear, but equally important, is the political legacy of statistics, the way that
the use of statistics by itself shapes public debate. (Note 2. Uses second browser window.)
Discussion about teenage pregnancy is a good example of how the existence and distribution
of statistics shapes debate. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, as teenage birth rates were
decreasing, the Alan Guttmacher Institute and others began publicizing estimates of teen
fertility statistics to illustrate what they termed an epidemic of teenage pregnancy. The social
construction of teen pregnancy as a growing problem contributed to political support for
policies such as family planning and has been critical in debates over the consequences of
family planning policies, even when the statistics were questionable (Vinovskis 1988).
Feminism also contributed to changing attitudes towards family planning policies, but the
paradox for social scientists is that demographic trends did not affect perceptions of the
levels of teen pregnancy. Academic researchers on teen pregnancy have recognized the
incongruity that the definition of teen pregnancy as a social problem coincided with a
decrease in birth rates (e.g., Furstenberg 1991). Still, gross numbers (for example, total
births to teen mothers) created the popular perception of a crisis. Statistics help define
perceptions of social realities and possibilities. Starr (1987: 54) has noted,
An average is not just a number; it often becomes a standard. . . . Many
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regularly reported social and economic indicators have instantly recognizable
normative content. The numbers do not provide strictly factual information.
Since the frameworks of normative judgment are so widely shared, the numbers
are tantamount to a verdict.
The existence and frequent public reporting of teen pregnancy statistics by themselves
created public debate that led to policies attempting to limit teen pregnancies. Much other
public reporting of statistics likewise shapes public debate: Newspapers and broadcast news
regularly report unemployment and inflation figures, crime rates, and school test scores.
     The distinction between practice and political legacies of statistics is useful in explaining
why accountability practices are so popular and what the potential consequences of the most
commonly-discussed accountability systems might be in the long term for school politics.
Most critics of high-stakes standardized testing point to the practice legacy, the way that
high-stakes testing may narrow the focus of teaching and provide perverse incentives within
schools and school systems. However, the political legacy is as important as, and in some
important ways dovetails with, the practice legacy. High-stakes testing narrows how we
judge schools as institutions and whose school success is important. Moreover, opponents of
high-stakes testing rarely consider the political legacy of proposed alternatives. The most
prominent alternative vision of accountability revolves around the outdated model of
ascendant professionalism. A consideration of accountability's political legacy would require
different alternatives to high-stakes testing, ones that would cultivate deliberate political
connections between schools and communities. 
Table of Contents
The Importance of Political Legacies
The Popularity of School Accountability
Unexamined Assumptions of Accountability
The Political Costs of Accountability
The Political Weaknesses of Professionalism
The Ground We Stand on
Where To Go
References (uses a second browser window)
The Importance of Political Legacies
     I choose the term political legacy for statistics because statistical systems constitute a 
special example of how public policy creates long-term consequences for public debate.
Those who study government from a variety of disciplines recognize that public policies set
in motion political dynamics that shape the contours (and sometimes define the limits) of
accepted political debate. Two parts of the original Social Security Act of 1935, pension
insurance and Aid to Dependent Children (the federal program most call welfare),
demonstrate the way that policies can define the political landscape. The pension insurance
part of Social Security is a universal program; anyone who pays into Social Security as a
wage-earner (as well as a beneficiary defined by law) is eligible for payments when older.
The universality of the Social Security pension has made its basic features unassailable
politically. By contrast, federal welfare was a means-tested program. Only poor people (and
not all poor people) were ever eligible for federally-supported welfare programs. Unlike
Social Security pension insurance, welfare was politically vulnerable because of its means
testing. Since most people would like to live long, they think of Social Security as an
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important safety net. But most people do not want to be poor and, as critically, may not think
they ever will be poor enough to be on welfare. The universality of Social Security has
protected it politically. Thus, when President Ronald Reagan suggested changing the
pension program in the early 1980s, politicians rallied to support the system. However,
without universality, federal welfare had a much less powerful base of support, and the
Republican Congress and President Bill Clinton ended the federal welfare guarantee in
1996. The original outlines of the two programs shaped future debate over them (Skocpol
1991). 
     The different histories of school desegregation in the South and elsewhere since 1954 are
also results of a political legacy. The fundamental paradox of desegregation is that the South
(including border states) had the most integrated schools in the country by the late 1980s
(Orfield 1993). Southern schools have been more integrated because of two policies
vigorously pursued by white, racist politicians and officials before 1954: state laws
mandating segregation and policies of school and government consolidation. Because state
law and intentional acts by school officials were an obvious cause of school segregation,
federal courts after 1954 had clear and convincing evidence of unconstitutional segregation
in Southern systems and were willing to order far-reaching remedies in the late 1960s and
early 1970s. In addition, Southern school systems are usually much larger than systems in
many other states because of consistent success in consolidating school systems this century.
For example, Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, has one school administration, so the
suburbs of Charlotte are in the same school system as the city. In contrast, the suburbs of
Boston are in school systems separate from the central city. Desegregation advocates in the
South had two advantages stemming from consolidation. First, courts were more willing to
order metropolitan desegregation plans in the South, after the Milliken v. Bradley (1974) 
decision required that judges find specific evidence of discriminatory intent to remedy
metropolitan segregation in fragmented urban areas. Second, large systems made white
flight more difficult. Because the South had both a history of state-directed discrimination
and also large school systems, desegregation efforts in the region in the late 1960s and early
1970s were more vigorous and far-reaching than in the rest of the U.S (Douglas 1995;
Orfield, Eaton, and the Harvard Project on School Desegregation 1996). The political legacy
of statutory segregation and school consolidation made extensive desegregation more
feasible in the South.
     These stories, of government pension and welfare programs in one case and
desegregation in the other, demonstrate the relationship between the structure of public
policy and later political decision-making. To be sure, that influence is not one-way. A
government is not an empty vessel easily manipulated by electoral and other political forces.
Instead, government agencies have their own interests, and officials often act in their
organizational interests (Balogh 1991b; Galambos 1970). Schools, like other public bodies,
have their own professional and organization dynamics that mediate, rather than
automatically reflect, outside influences. Thus, when we speak of a political legacy of school
policies (including statistical systems), that legacy is part of a larger negotiation over the role
of public schools. Two facets of that constant bargaining are particularly relevant to
understanding the current school accountability regime: the limits of educators' professional
authority and the local nature of schooling. First, as explained in the next paragraph, school
administrators have tried to claim both bureaucratic autonomy and public acknowledgement
of expertise involved in running schools. They have been far more successful in the former
task than in the latter. In addition, schooling is a local, public service. Local political control
of schools, and the close watch that one can theoretically keep over such institutions, may be
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one reason why school administrators garnered autonomy earlier in this century. One can
thus view statistical accountability systems as one way to resolve the dilemma between
granting autonomy and authority to educators and keeping them under some political
control. 
     The political legacy of statistical accountability systems is important because support for
publicly controlled schools is fragile. School administrators deliberately built a set of
bureaucratic institutions in the early twentieth century to buffer themselves politically, in
part by claiming the need for autonomy to exercise professional judgment and wield their
expertise (Tyack 1974; Tyack and Hansot 1982). That autonomy, and the justification for
publicly controlled schooling, has been on the wane since mid-century for several reasons.
First, the civil rights movement targeted schools as one public institution that was treating
poor and minority children unequally. The attack on school inequalities undermined support
both from those who thought that inequality is morally wrong and also from those who had 
relied on state and local control of education to preserve bastions of private privilege (Kozol
1991). Second, the credibility of public institutions as a whole has deteriorated. In part, the
Vietnam War and Watergate created a credibility gap between what public leaders said and
what most citizens saw happening (Schell 1975); in addition, the internal politics of public
agencies have damaged their ability to wield professional consensus as a political force
(Balogh 1991a). Third, schools have been the target for half a century of accusations of
ineffectiveness and soft standards. All of these events undermined the legitimacy of school
administrators as autonomous professionals and public schools as worthy of financial and
political support (Tyack and Hansot 1982). Privatization, through charter schools or
vouchers, represents one potential result of declining support for school systems as publicly
financed and controlled organizations. The political legacy of current educational reforms,
including growing development of statistical accountability systems, will define in some
measure the future debates about schooling. 
Return to Table of Contents
The Popularity of School Accountability
     The public judging of schools by test scores is relatively new in the United States. School
statistics have existed since the late 19th century, and claims to objective measurement of
student achievement from the turn of the 20th, but achievement scores have typically been
only for internal consumption within school bureaucracies until recently. In the wave of
school criticism after World War II, ideological debates over progressive education and the
needs of the Cold War were the explicit points of conflict; statistical evaluations were
invisible in the 1940s and 1950s debates over schooling (Ravitch 1983: 71-80, 228-32;
Spring 1989: 10-33). The public debate over Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) score trends
did not exist until the mid-1970s, even though the decline in mean scores began in the early
1960s. The New York Times, for example, did not start reporting SAT scores annually until
1976 (Maeroff 1976). No network news broadcasts between 1968 (when the Vanderbilt
Television News Archive began recording and indexing network news) and 1974 reported
test scores as the substance of the story; the first networks to do so after 1967 were ABC and
CBS on October 28, 1975. (Note 3. Uses second browser window.) The popular reporting of
periodic student data, therefore, is of relatively recent vintage. One may consider statistics as
one of many types of evidence and reasoning in public debate, such as the following list
(meant to be an illustrative rather than a comprehensive typology):
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Ideology
Debates can focus on the purposes of schools and the perspectives offered 
in the curriculum or in teaching techniques. The attack on what
progressivism had become by the 1940s is an example of ideological
debate, as was the attack on outcome-based education in the early 1990s
in Pennsylvania and elsewhere.
Representative Story
Debates can center on real or apocryphal stories about education that
represent the issue at hand. Anecdotes about high school graduates who 
cannot read (and the argued need for higher graduation standards) are an
example of argumentation from representative story.
Statistics
Debates over the quality of education in the 1980s, following the Nation 
at Risk report (National Commission on Excellence in Education 1983),
are an example of discussion focused on statistics.
Direct Observation
Debates can also focus on what individuals have seen, first-hand, in
schools. I do not know of any national debate relying on directly observed 
evidence.
The self-evident explanation of the last statement suggests, in part, that we focus on
statistics because having a "national discussion" based on personal, direct observation of
schools is a contradiction in terms: we cannot each observe the nation's schools, and our
judgment of "the nation's schools" will depend on second- or third-hand information. Still,
most discussion of schools, and even school statistics, is local. Only thirteen network news
broadcasts in the twenty-year period 1968-1987 reported statistical test score trends. (Note 3.
Uses second brower window.) Most reporting on education, and most of what individuals
hear and read from popular media sources, is still in local news broadcasts and local
newspapers. Why, then, have local educational debates generally assumed the importance of
statistics, something that makes more sense for a national debate?
     The common use of statistical mechanisms to gauge school effectiveness, including the
power of standardized test scores, owes its existence to the tension between the development
of a national debate over education in the twentieth century and the continuation of local
decision-making. The result is a set of themes which dominates discussion in cities and
states across the country and that borrow much of their character and assumptions from the
national debate. In many cities and towns, for example, newspapers and local news
broadcasts describe similar issues such as discipline problems and whether high school
graduates are ready for the workplace. Several changes in schooling since the early 19th
century have encouraged a national debate. First, educational reformers have typically
borrowed from each other's ideas, spreading them from region to region. Second,
professional educators and muckraking journalists in the late 19th and early 20th century
explicitly campaigned in nationally-distributed journals against school corruption and the
decrepit conditions in urban schools, on the one hand, and for professional autonomy on the
other. Their campaign nationalized the Progressive Era education debate. Third,
administrative progressives (as David Tyack has termed them) were successful in creating
standard institutional routines in the first half of the 20th century, so that many school
experiences adults remember now are much more similar across the country than adult
memories of childhood were 150 years ago. We thus have a common set of experiences
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nationally, making the terms of debate familiar. Finally, the nationalization of politics more
generally after World War II encouraged the debate over Cold War schooling described
earlier. The civil rights movement and desegregation consolidated that national framework
for discussion.
     Still, the national educational discussion is a layer on top of and filtering down through
older, local politics of schooling. Localism has remained a powerful force. It has controlled
the politics of local and federal educational programs. For example, Southern members of
Congress were critical in supporting federal vocational education programs early in the
century because the federal government allowed Southern states to distribute funds
disproportionately to white vocational programs and create different curriculum programs by
race. The result was that vocational education programs served to reinforce the Southern
caste structure (Werum 1997). Traditional federal deference to state action also modified
and limited Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, whose implementation still helped
force school desegregation in the South (Orfield 1969). Opposition to federal intrusion has
limited national action to the present, including President Clinton's desire for tests created
and organized by the federal government. Politicians are willing for schools to buy
textbooks from national publishers, accepting a tacit national curriculum (Miller 1997).
Federal government decision-making, however, threatens more than local control of
curriculum; it threatens local political networks and ways of doing business. Local political
control of school policies and funding thus vie with the national debate. The result is
frequently a set of variations on common practices, resulting in the illusion of local control
in many school matters. Standardized testing and accountability systems are one example of
that limited variation. States are free to choose commercial tests, develop their own, or not
to engage in high-stakes testing at all. Today, however, most local school systems or states
test children in the spring using multiple-choice tests with scores that schools can compare
(using the publisher's data) against a norming population of children in the same grade. In
the past dec de, many states and local districts have added real consequences for the tests,
including publicly releasing score data. The result is a patchwork of high-stakes testing that
covers most of the nation. Despite theoretical local choice about standardized testing, one
way of publicly judging schools has become dominant.
     The emergence of contemporary school "accountability" dependent on test score results
combined an existing set of practices (standardized testing) with the judgment of local
schools within a national framework. Within a decade, public judgment of schools by test
statistics became common, after the College Board publicized the decline in mean SAT
scores, states began instituting minimum competency tests, and the National Commission on
Excellence in Education published A Nation at Risk in 1983. Two historical perspectives
underline the importance of understanding the political implications of school accountability
systems.
Accountability has turned the use of educational statistics upside-down. Statistics
bolstered the claims of administrators to expertise early in this century, but politicians
and popular news media now use statistics to judge school systems. This reversal
shows the weakness of local school administrators in claiming professional authority.
Autonomy within bureaucratic organization, not public respect of their expertise, is
the primary power of school officials.
 
The popularity of published test scores obscures alternative ways of judging schools.
In less than twenty-five years, statistical accountability has become so ubiquitous that
it appears inevitable. The change has been, in retrospect, both breathtaking and
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alarming in its speed. Political debate over the meaning of statistics has largely
eclipsed other ways of describing what happens in classrooms.
The dominance of educational test scores today hides the fact that we did not have to use
statistics as the dominant way of describing schools and their problems, and that in the past
we have used many other means. Even when we evaluate local schools using nation-wide
questions, we can use many sources of information. Assuming we must use primarily
statistics is dangerous. We must remember that the evaluation of schools by test score
statistics is one among many possible ways of seeing education through both national and
local perspectives. Whether we made that choice consciously or wisely is a different
question.
Return to Table of Contents
Unexamined Assumptions of Accountability
     One consequence of public policy is the definition of legitimate debate and, by extension,
what is not part of mainstream public discussion. Often, the assumed axioms underlying
policies silence other relevant concerns (Fine 1991: 32-34). Despite more than twenty years
of debate about the statistical performance of students in the U.S. and the proper direction
for school reform, remarkably few voices in public have questioned the primary assumptions
behind the move towards accountability. This silencing shows what we are avoiding when
we speak glibly of a political consensus around school accountability. While we are agreeing
to high-stakes testing, what uncomfortable issues are we not discussing? The broad political
legacy of statistical accountability systems is the narrowing of legitimate topics for public
debate. We do not often discuss the purpose of accountability or who will be making the key
decisions to keep schools accountable. 
Accountability for what purposes?
     The dominant discussion of accountability leaves vague the goal of accountability
mechanisms. The improvement of schools is an insufficient goal because accountability is
fundamentally a political and not a technical process. Accountability has multiple meanings,
in both a general sense and also the current sense in education of statistical judgment
(Darling-Hammond and Ascher 1991). The apparent consensus for "accountability" hides
the differences (and the conflicts) among the following meanings of statistical systems.
     Judging public schools as institutions. One may use test score statistics to judge schools
as a set of institutions. This sense of accountability (judging the worth of schools in general
by test scores) is one of the most widely used tools in school politics. The annual release of
average SAT scores in the late 1970s prepared the ground politically for the claim of
declining school effectiveness made by the National Commission on Educational Excellence
(1983). One political legacy of judging public schooling by test scores is the assumption that
schooling is a monolithic entity that fails or succeeds as a single body. What this myth of a
monolithic system hides is wide variations in schooling, especially between poor and
wealthy schools (Kozol 1991). Another political legacy is that, after intense media focus on
statistics that suggest poor schooling, citizens may face difficulty reconciling popular
conceptions of failing schools with information gathered in other ways. Polls consistently
show that parents' perceptions of their local schools are more positive than their perceptions
of schooling nationwide (e.g., Rose, Gallup, and Elam 1997). In addition, private interests
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may subvert policies based on the gross judgment of schools. For example, some wealthy
parents in one Michigan district deliberately pulled their children out of high-stakes
standardized testing when they perceived that it might hurt their children (Johnston 1997).
They may well have been willing to have high-stakes testing for "other people's children" (to
borrow from Lisa Delpit's 1995 book title) but not theirs. This consequence is the
educational equivalent of urban development NIMBY (Not in My Back Yard) syndrome.
     Judging teachers and other educators. One may also justify accountability as a way to 
raise (or clarify) expectations and goals for teachers and administrators. An explicit part of
accountability systems in the last few years has been the evaluation of teachers, principals,
and other administrators. For example, the Tennessee Value-Added Assessment System,
passed in 1992, originally mandated statistical measures of student gain as part of personnel
evaluation (Educational Improvement Act of 1992). An earlier variant of judging teachers,
schools, and school systems by comparative statistics was the U.S. Department of
Education's "Wall Chart" instituted by Terrence Bell as an attempt to spur reform (Ginsburg,
Noell, and Plisko 1988). This use of accountability, focusing on teachers and administrators,
is the one most criticized as encouraging teaching to the test and "gaming" test results
(Cannell 1989; Glass 1990; Madaus 1988, 1991; McGill-Franzen and Allington 1993;
Merrow 1997; Shepard 1991; Smith 1991; Smith and Rottenberg 1991). The political
legacy, however, may be even more harmful: By setting up a system based on the distrust of
teachers, we make alternative ways of judging teachers and schools more difficult (Fisher
1996; Sizer 1992: 188-89). 
     Judging students. In many states and school systems, standardized tests have high stakes
not only for educators but also for individuals students, as scores can be among the criteria
for entrance to academic programs, grade promotion, or other real rewards and punishments
in schooling. The use of tests to sort students U.S. began with monitorial schools in the early
nineteenth century and admissions tests to early public high schools (Kaestle 1973; Labaree
1988; Reese 1995). More recently, the use of so-called minimum competency tests emerged
in the late 1970s as a response to allegedly lowered standards of public schools (Bracey
1995b). The rationale of using tests to make students accountable is that, having test scores
as a clear goal, students and schools would meet the expectations (Ravitch 1995). One
potential legacy of such high stakes, however, is the rhetorical scapegoating of students.
Calhoun (1973: 70-72) describes one purpose of testing in schools as displacing blame for
ineffective teaching onto students. If a student fails a test, one may reason, the failure is the
student's intelligence and lack of diligence. That consequence is already evident in many
states with high-stakes testing. In Tennessee, for example, the teachers union pressed to
exempt scores of students with disabilities from teacher value-added statistics ("Sanders
model to measure 'value added'" 1991). One might presume that children with disabilities
are those on whom we should most focus attention in evaluating teaching effectiveness. Yet
teachers asked for the exclusion of scores because, the union argued, including such scores
would be unfair to teachers. The displacement of blame for failed schooling onto students is
a legacy of testing that existed well before high-stakes standardized testing, but
accountability systems may exacerbate such tendencies (e.g., McGill-Franzen and Allington
1993; McGrew, Vanderwood, Thurlow, and Ysseldyke 1995; National Center on
Educational Outcomes 1994). 
     Judging public policy. One might use standardized test scores (like other information) to
evaluate public policies. The National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) tests,
begun in 1969, is theoretically a means for using non-high-stakes testing to evaluate public
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school policy with objective data. NAEP data is at the heart of some recent debate about
school and student performance (see Berliner and Biddle 1995, 1996; Stedman 1996a,
1996b). However, demands to use the NAEP to judge educators and students in high-stakes
systems is threatening to compromise NAEP's use as a lower stakes way to gather
information about student performance (Jones 1996; Koretz 1992a). One problem is the
technical and fiscal demands of high-stakes versus low-stakes systems. In addition, however,
is the ideological debate about the use of information. Can one maintain a low-stakes
statistical system in the face of political pressures for high-stakes accountability?
     Building organizations. In a broad sense, standardized testing supports the determination
or control of curriculum content at the state and national levels. Some such as Ravitch
(1995) explicitly advocate curriculum content standards and see teaching to the test as valid
with appropriate testing and content. One consequence of statistical accountability, however,
is the creation of new public and private organizations producing educational statistics.
Publicly, states now have accountability or evaluation offices whose job is to provide the
technical expertise in analyzing test data, and the federal government has the National
Center for Educational Statistics, which contracts out NAEP as well as compiling and
disseminating a wide variety of educational statistics. Private organizations supported by
testing are the companies that write and sell tests or contract with agencies for the creation
of specific tests. With each public release of test score statistics, popular news sources,
politicians, administrators, and the public rely more on relatively anonymous technocrats to
explain what is happening in schools. Other new professions this century, such as nuclear
science, have also staked their claim to expertise on political factors (Balogh 1991a). The
fact that this reliance on statisticians stems from political pressure for school reform usually
escapes notice.
     Marketing. Schools occasionally use student statistics as part of public marketing
strategies, either to attract students who have choices (as in selective colleges) or to bolster
public support. One of the largest metropolitan school systems in the country recently
produced a pamphlet boldly titled, "Our Students' Test Scores Reflect Academic
Achievement" (Hillsborough County Public Schools 1997). While one paragraph cautions
that test scores are not the sole basis for evaluating students or schools, the rest of the
pamphlet trumpets above-average achievement. Public relations was a strong motivation
behind what Cannell (1989) called the "Lake Wobegon" effect of claiming high test scores
in public reporting through the use of outdated norms. The use of accountability data for
marketing is an open secret among administrators. As Dennie Wolf said in the John Merrow
documentary Testing . . . Testing . . . Testing (1997), "Districts sell real estate based on test 
scores." With the decline of administrative authority described elsewhere in this article,
superintendents have considerable interest in boasting about their systems using any tools at
their command. 
     These varied purposes of accountability are not necessarily congruent. The use of test
scores to bash public schools is not compatible with a nuanced debate over public policy,
and students and teachers may have conflicts of interest when tests have high stakes for
both. In addition to inconsistent purposes, the aims of accountability do not easily include
other issues relevant to education: equity, the direction of curriculum, or the purposes of
education more broadly in a changing world (Darling-Hammond 1992). One dominant
assumption of accountability systems is that the goals of education are agreed upon and we
need only establish a system to measure whether schools and students meet those goals. The
creation of statistical accountability systems may freeze the assumption of a single purpose
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of statistical accountability into a framework for the politically accepted discussion in
education for years hence. 
Who keeps schools accountable?
     A second unexamined assumption is that central bureaucracies and popular news media
are the logical, natural places for holding schools accountable for performance. In most
school testing regimes, central offices (at the state or local level) are responsible for the
general logistics of testing and compiling results. Results at some level are then available to
administrators, public boards of education, and media organizations. In many states and
regions, newspapers publish test score statistics, often ranking schools or systems based on
the scores. But who is not among the direct targets of test score dissemination is as
important as who is.
     Judges and advocates monitoring school system compliance in discrimination cases. 
Judges and advocates overseeing compliance with nondiscrimination orders (such as
desegregation) generally are not intended users of "accountability" information. Despite
promises by school systems to pay closer attention to achievement in desegregation cases,
local systems have a very spotty record in demonstrating success after the end of
desegregation orders. Orfield, Eaton, and the Harvard Project on School Desegregation
(1996) has compiled evidence that, in several of the major cases this past decade, school
districts released from desegregation monitoring by the courts not only experienced
resegregation but growing achievement gaps between white and minority students. The new
accountability system does not appear geared to keep systems accountable in this respect.
Many advocates appointed to monitoring and advisory commissions have reported to Orfield
and his associates that local systems have either denied information (such as disaggregated
test scores) outright or made the gathering of data extremely difficult. In addition, the
Supreme Court decision in Missouri v. Jenkins (1995) declared that district court judges 
should consider test scores as marginally important (at most) as a measure of compliance
with racial equity requirements. The only major case where a court has continued to monitor
standardized test scores as part of a major equity lawsuit has been in New Jersey, where the
state's supreme court continues to criticize inequalities between the education offered
children in the wealthiest and poorest systems of the state (Abbott v. Burke 1997). In the past 
five years, the court has broadened its focus from just monetary support of schools to
include measurable outcomes. The New Jersey Supreme Court has been a lonely exception
to the general rule, especially in the federal judiciary: Accountability does not appear to
require even reasonably equitable outcomes. 
     Parents and the general public. Parents receive test scores of their children, but rarely do
they or the general public have direct access to test score results or their limitations. Popular 
news sources (television, radio, and newspapers) mediate the transmission of information,
often deleting information critical to understanding the limits of such data or transforming
the statistics in ways either incomprehensible to readers or to create invalid statistical
comparisons. The reporting of high-stakes test data by Nashville metropolitan newspapers
form a case in point. Beginning in 1993, the state of Tennessee reported test results of
schools and districts using a complex statistical system called the Tennessee Value Added
Assessment System. The state's newspapers have quickly rushed to print school-by-school
scores including rankings, even where schools many rankings apart had negligible
differences in scores (in other words, when the rankings were unjustified by the statistics).
For example, in 1996 the Nashville Tennessean transformed the value-added scores into
percentile ranking, even though the technical documentation for value-added scores would
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not support such an interpretation (Bock and Wolfe 1996: Chaps. 5-6; Klausnitzer 1996;
Tennessee Department of Education 1996). Why did the Tennessean transform value-added
scores that were the result of a prior statistical manipulation, and why did the paper then
rank schools? One reporter explained:
We chose to report in percentile ranks because it helps people see how their
school stacks up against the rest of the state, and because this information is not
available anywhere else. It was calculated by The Tennessean... [because] we 
wanted to offer something unique. We also wanted to answer our readers'
number one question about the test scores: How does my child's school compare
to the other schools? (Lisa Green, e-mail to author, December 5, 1996)
In addition, the newspaper reported percentile rankings by tenths (for example, 50.1 instead
of 50th percentile). The same reporter acknowledged that the newspaper staff did not
consciously justify that apparent precision: 
There's really no need to report these numbers down to the tenth of a percentile.
However, the programming for the site was written last year ... so the computer
automatically included the decimal place, and we didn't think it was necessary
to take it off. (Lisa Green, e-mail to author, December 5, 1996)
In this case, a metropolitan newspaper's desire to have "something unique" conflicted with
its readership's interest in having clearly understandable information to interpret
independently, or even information with a justifiable level of detail. Even if one assumes
that the value-added scores are comprehensible, transforming those into percentile rankings
was neither valid nor necessary for rankings (itself a method of reporting scores which the
state's external evaluators recommended against). In no case did the newspaper note what
the evaluators clearly stated: that school scores were unstable and could not be relied on for
clear distinctions in performance (Bock and Wolfe 1996: Chap. 5-6). The dissemination of
information through two intermediaries (the state government and news sources) in essence
created one dominant way to analyze scores in the metropolitan Nashville area: how did
schools "stack up" in competition with each other? The false precision in percentile rankings
suggested that readers could rely on the numbers as rigorous, objective facts. The accuracy
of newspaper reporting is also questionable; the Tennessean had to reprint its comparative
tables in 1994 because of acknowledged gross errors in reporting ("How Midstate Schools
Stack Up" 1994a, 1994b). While comparisons among schools may be appropriate in some
ways, the presentation of school scores suggested a certainty which was incompatible either
with the statistical calculations or the mediation of state agencies and newspapers in
transmitting test scores.
     Moreover, the dissemination and discussion of today's school accountability systems strip
parents and the general public of control and ownership of information. In the case of
Nashville, a reporter reduced parental evaluation of schools to examining rankings in a table,
akin to sports league rankings (see Wilson 1996). One might contrast the typical method of
disseminating accountability statistics with two alternative local methods of accountability:
the "visiting committee" of town elders in the eighteenth and early nineteenth-century
district schools, on the one hand, and the calculation of dropout statistics by a Hispanic
activist organization in Chicago in the 1980s, on the other. In many district schools, a small
committee of citizens held the power of hiring and firing over schoolteachers and could visit
the school at any time (e.g., Cohen 1973: 407). Accountability in district schools was a
rough-and-tumble affair, often unfair to teachers, but local citizens could form judgments in
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a simple way: watching classrooms. Independent gathering of data today is also possible. In
the 1980s, Aspira, Inc., a Hispanic activist organization, suspected that official dropout
statistics from the Chicago public schools were inaccurate or fraudulent and conducted its
own research. Activists then used the independent statistics to help prod Chicago towards
urban school reform (Hess 1991: 7-21; Kyle and Kantowicz 1991). In both cases,
individuals at the local level produced and acted on their own judgments of schools.
Reliance on centrally-calculated statistics in accountability systems often overrides local,
independent judgment of schools. 
     The fundamental issue of control is directly connected to the purposes of accountability:
Individuals in different roles would ask different questions of accountability mechanisms.
Politicians might ask whether schools "measure up" to some standard (such as a national
norm). Business leaders might ask about workplace-related skills and behavior. College
faculty would want students to have some intellectual foundation. Parents might ask whether
their children are getting enough individual attention. Who should be asking the hard
questions about schools? The history of the Common Core of Data (a set of education data
collected by the federal government since the early 1970s) illustrates the difficulties of
creating an explicit consensus. Because of pressures within government, doubts about its
utility and cost, and disagreements about what it should measure, the Common Core of Data
for many years gathered relatively innocuous information in a history Janet Weiss and Judith
Gruber (1987) described as "managed irrelevance." Of all the information used by the
National Commission on Excellence in Education (1983) to lambaste the condition of
schools, none came from the official federal education database (Weiss and Gruber 1987:
370). What we face is not an explicit consensus but a hidden one, never debated clearly,
founded on the spread of standardized test scores. Statistical accountability systems suggest
an objectivity and universality of coverage which is impossible. As Sizer (1995: 34) noted
with regard to the debate about educational standards, "The word system has come up
again; . . . Essentially, it implies a technocratic approach." We should not evade the political
question of the purposes of schools through the production of statistics. The current
penchant for statistical accountability systems diverts resources to a mechanism that hinders
discussing the nuts and bolts of schooling. We hide behind the apparently objective notion
of an accountability system.
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The Political Costs of Accountability
     The political legacy of statistical accountability systems is complex because of the
different possible aims of (and justifications for) accountability and also because statistical
systems will vary among different states and districts. Nonetheless, one can identify several
broad patterns which stem at least in part from the proliferation of statistical accountability
systems. Two legacies have seriously damaged our collective ability to have reasoned, broad
discussion about the aims of schooling and reasonable public policy. Statistical judgment of
school has narrowed the basis on which we judge schools and has also encouraged
impatience with school reform.
Narrowed Judgment of Schools
     Technocratic models of school reform threaten to turn accountability into a narrow,
mechanistic discussion based on numbers far removed from the gritty reality of classrooms.
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Over the past twenty years, the dominant method of discussing the worth of schools in
general has been the public reporting of aggregate standardized test score results. Popular
news sources typically distort and oversimplify such findings (Berliner and Biddle 1995;
Darling-Hammond 1992; Koretz 1992b; Koretz and Diebert 1993; Shepard 1991). The
recent public debate over schools is not rich, reliant on multiple sources, or nuanced. Nor is
the reliance on statistics inevitable in national discourse, despite recent history. Prior waves
of reform, such as concerns about math and science education in the 1940s and 1950s
(whether one agrees with their goals or not) did not need test score data as motivation or
evidence (Ravitch 1983). 
     Test-score data and its use have pushed other issues to the margins. The aftermath of the
1983 report A Nation at Risk eclipsed two major policy initiatives of the first Reagan
administration. The early 1980s saw dramatic cutbacks in the support of the federal
government for state and local public schools. At the same time, social conservatives both in
and out of the Reagan White House were arguing for the creation of vouchers to support
parents sending their children to private schools. Neither of these issues, however, were part
of the central discussion of education policy after the release of A Nation at Risk. The
dominant discussion in popular news media revolved instead around declining test scores,
the presumed responsibility of schools for national economic decline, and how to tighten
academic standards (Berliner and Biddle 1995; Bracey 1995b). Few mentioned changes in
the federal budget or privatization proposals, even though one was a concrete policy of the
Reagan administration and the other was a radical proposal for changing the governance of
schools. Ironically, the dominant discussion suppressed issues which concerned both liberals
(upset at budget priorities) and social conservatives (wanting vouchers).
     More recently, New Jersey Governor Christine Todd Whitman tried to argue that a
standards-based accountability system alone could improve the state's schools. Her
department of education responded to the state Supreme Court's call for equity with
state-level achievement standards but no added resources, despite the state's history of
vividly unequal funding among school systems. The argument by the executive branch was
that standards, by themselves and despite existing funding inequities, would create school
improvement. The assumption by Whitman is that test-based school accountability, as a
technocratic mechanism with threatened sanctions, is sufficient to change schools, even
schools with the worst records. The state court agreed with the governor in that New Jersey
could have state-level standards but disagreed with the argument that funding was irrelevant.
It then ordered the state to improve its funding of poor schools (once again) (Abbott v. Burke
1997). New Jersey is fortunate in having one branch of government able and willing to
articulate a complex view of what school reform requires. In general, however, extending
public discussion of schools beyond test-score statistics is difficult.
Impatience with Reform
     On a political level, impatience with reform and the cyclical reporting of statistics
encourages the dominant myth of contemporary educational politics, that schools continue to
decline in quality. (Note 4. Uses second browser window.) That myth encourages a cynicism
towards reform strategies. We should not be surprised that we have witnessed several
"waves" of reforms since the regular publishing of SAT scores began in the 1970s. The
mundane details of statistical accountability systems encourages fads. Without a concrete
sense of what children and teachers should be or are doing, the public compares statistics
against a set of arbitrary benchmarks.
16 of 33
     On a practical level, statistical accountability produces both undue impatience with
reform and laxity towards incompetence. The yearly reporting of test scores creates an
artificial schedule for judging schools: Do they improve by the next set of annual tests? The
periodic nature of reporting school statistics drives the disposal of reform writ large, because
policy changes cannot change classroom practices on a deep and fundamental level or
become institutionalized in a short time (Lipsky 1980; Tyack and Cuban 1995). Yet,
paradoxically, the annual time-frame of standardized testing gives too much time for weak 
teachers to flounder without guidance or correction. Pinning personnel practices to annual
testing may undermine the obligation of fellow teachers and administrators to keep a close
eye on teachers without the necessary classroom skills. Principals may feel inclined to give
poor teachers until the following cycle of annual tests to improve. For children, however, a
year of being with an incompetent teacher can be extremely destructive. The problem is in
part one of inappropriate time scales. Annual tests are too infrequent for appropriate
guidance of instruction or evaluation of teaching, while they are too frequent to measure
broader changes in schools.
     In addition, standardized test accountability discourages the evaluation of what happens
in the classroom. As long as a school or teacher has adequate test scores, what happens in
the classroom is irrelevant. Similarly, poor test scores indicate needed change, no matter
what happens in the classroom. The philosophy behind such practice-blind evaluation is
putatively to give teachers autonomy. As the designer of one state's accountability system
explained, accountability statistics allow teachers to make their own choices (Sanders and
Horn 1994). Ultimately, however, this diminution of practice undermines teacher and school
power, for several reasons. First, teachers do not usually have time to review and evaluate on
their own a wide array of alternative teaching methods; they need support in selecting,
adapting, and implementing different methods and curricula. Second, parents and other
citizens do care about what happens in classrooms. Schools trying dramatic departures from
normal practices face (sometimes very reasonable) criticism from parents even when the
intent is to respond to the accountability system. Separating accountability from the sense of
what a "real" school is (Tyack and Cuban 1995) is deceptive in the long run. It gives schools
the following message: "Make your choices because we only care about test statistics. But
we won't give you enough support to follow up on your choices, and in the end we will
condemn your choices if they violate our ideas of what schools should be." One
consequence of statistics-driven impatience is increased cynicism among teachers and
administrators and their uncertainty about what the public really wants. Discussions isolated
from what happens in schools may be politically alluring and attractive to popular news
sources, but test scores drive a wedge between schools and the students and public they
serve. 
Parallels between Practice and Political Legacies
     The political legacies of high-stakes statistical accountability systems parallel the practice
legacies in two respects. First, narrowed political judgment of schools is the macropolitical
equivalent of teaching to the test, a narrowing of the curriculum. Researchers have
documented the tendency for teachers to narrow their focus to content and styles which they
perceive will result in high test scores (Madaus 1988, 1991; Smith 1991; Smith and
Rottenberg 1991; Shepard 1991). Relatively few teachers, faced with the onslaught of
standardized testing, are willing to innovate. Meier (1997: 9) writes,
The danger here is that we will cramp the needed innovations [in teaching] with
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over-ambitious accountability demands. Practical realism must prevail. Changes
in the daily conduct of schooling . . . are hard, slow, and above all immensely
time-consuming; they require qualities of trust and patience that we are not
accustomed to.
High-stakes accountability is not a system that demonstrates trust in teacher's capacities. By
signaling massive distrust, high-stakes testing instead provides low expectations for teachers
(Sizer 1992: 110-13). Imagine the result of a thought experiment: the plight of John Dewey's
University Lab School teachers under a high-stakes system. One might like to spend an
extended time exploring history and science through the concrete example of textile
manufacturing (Dewey 1899). In a modern accountability system, however, the state will test
the children in March or April, with much of the test based on several dozen discrete skills.
Whether the children can understand the role of textile mills in 19th century economic
changes, or whether they can explain what principles allow a loom to work, is irrelevant to
accountability systems based on standardized tests. Balancing such competing demands is
extremely difficult. Teachers and schools who fight the pedagogical consequences of
high-stakes testing are relatively unusual. Whether one agrees with the appropriateness of
multidisciplinary teaching for some or all children, one cannot confuse the expectations of
today's statistical accountability systems with expecting children to understand connections
between what they see in life and academic disciplines. The latter is of a higher order of
magnitude entirely. Relying on standardized tests and high-stakes production of test
statistics is itself a dumbing-down of political debate and expectations for schools.
     Similarly, impatience with reform and fad fetishes are the macropolitical equivalent of
being impatient with children's progress. The aggregation of test score data often gives
teachers and administrators incentives to exclude students whom they feel will harm test
figures. Repeated reports of test scandals, the plea by teachers in Tennessee to exclude
students with disabilities from their statistics, and variations in the proportion of students
tested provide continuing evidence of the perverse incentives high-stakes testing provides
(Glass 1990; Madaus 1988, 1991; McGill-Franzen and Allington 1993; McGrew et al. 1995;
Smith 1991; Smith and Rottenberg 1991; Shepard 1991). These incentives perpetuate a
dynamic of educational triage, wherein those who have the best chance to survive in life
because of other circumstances also have the best opportunities to learn (Fuchs and Fuchs
1995; Sapon-Shavin 1993).
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The Political Weaknesses of Professionalism
     If accountability based on standardized tests encourages a narrow political discussion
about education and impatience with schools, alternatives proposed by critics of
standardized testing confront the same history that engendered statistical accountability.
Dissenters from the accountability "consensus" exist, from longstanding standardized testing
critics at FairTest (http://www.fairtest.org) to the Coalition for Essential Schools
(http://www.ces.brown.edu) to Teachers College professor Linda Darling-Hammond and
Arthur Wise, current president of the National Council for Accreditation of Teacher
Education (NCATE). Each opposes the idea of motivating school reform by standardized
testing. The proposed alternative methods of motivating better teaching include performance
(sometimes called authentic) assessment of students, peer evaluation of teaching, and either
creating a second tier of high-status teachers or restricting entry into a limited number of
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high-status positions within teaching. Advocacy of greater professional authority in
education have generally focused on teacher education and preparation (e.g.,
Darling-Hammond, Wise, and Klein 1995; Holmes Group 1986; also see Labaree 1992), but
includes accountability; for example, Wise has been concerned with the deskilling of
teachers since Legislated Learning (1979). In general, the critics of standardized testing seek
greater teacher autonomy and respect from the public, and in that way we might call
professionalism the central value of the dissenters (e.g., Darling-Hammond 1988, Haefele
1992). Wise and Leibbrand (1993: 135) write that, "Hallmarks of a profession include
mastery of a body of knowledge and skills that lay people do not possess, autonomy in
practice, and autonomy in setting standards for the field." If teachers could successfully
professionalize, Wise and others suggest, they would gain more respect from the public and
earn the autonomy needed to improve schooling (e.g., Wise 1994). The logic of
professionalism is very appealing with the explicit parallels to the professionalism of
medicine (Starr 1982). It links mechanisms within schooling (who controls
decision-making) to the public status of teachers and the politics of schools. Professionalism
appears to be politically astute.
     Professionalism, however, is not likely to be a successful gambit in schooling, for several
reasons. Most importantly, professional ideology is politically unpalatable in the late
twentieth century. Trying to use professionalism misunderstands the historical context for
the ideology of expertise and its widespread (political) success a century ago.
Professionalism in the form of high-status, science-based occupations like medicine and
engineering was one response to the chaos of industrialization and changing class structure
(Wiebe 1967). Its early proponents argued that the complexities of modern life required
technical expertise to solve public policy and practical problems. However, professions
include more than high-status jobs, with occupations as diverse as architecture and craft
work like plumbing. A profession typically involves three dimensions: a claim to specialized
expertise, some informal or formal credentialing to control entry into the occupation, and
autonomy on the job (Friedson 1984). Classroom teaching falls partway among all three
dimensions. Classroom teaching does involve some skills that few could walk in off the
street with, but the general public has far more knowledge of what happens in classrooms
(and is more willing to make second judgments of teaching) than fields like surgery.
Long-term teaching requires credentials, but many school systems hire uncredentialed
personnel on an emergency basis. Finally, public schools operate as loosely coupled
organizations (Weick 1976): Most teachers can shut their doors in the face of some
supervisory directives, but material conditions (such as the textbooks available)
circumscribe their autonomy on the job, and they face other demands they cannot ignore,
such as the official curriculum and standardized tests. We should see the ideology of
professionalism thus as attempting to emulate a relatively small slice of all occupations with
professional traits rather than, as is typically assumed, making teaching a "real" profession.
Teaching already is a real profession, though one with less claim to specialized expertise and
less autonomy than advocates of teacher professionalism would want.
     Professionalism theories today appeal to an outdated ideal of insularity and ascendant
authority. The worst excesses of school bureaucracies today stem from successful
professionalism, albeit not in the classroom. Superintendents at the turn of the century
argued that schools needed to be away from political battles that would harm the integrity of
school systems. Creating an autonomous professional unit (a central school office) would
improve administrative efficiency and rid schools of corruption (Tyack 1974; Tyack and
Hansot 1982). Their success accelerated the bureaucratization of urban school systems.
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Today, however, professionalism is no longer unquestioned. School administration has
credentialism and relative autonomy on the job, but not as much claim to specialized
expertise as sixty or seventy years ago. Not only are North Americans far more skeptical of
professional authority than fifty years ago (as discussed earlier), but capital mobility is
impinging on professional authority in a wide range of fields. The parallels made between
teacher professionalism and medical professionalism is jarring. One cannot today call
medicine an autonomous profession when doctors are complaining that clerical workers and
financial officers in health maintenance organizations are limiting their clinical
decision-making (Bodenheimer 1996).
     In addition to ignoring the historical decline of professionalism, arguments for advancing
teacher professionalism undermines democratic control of schools. As Strike (1990: 362)
noted, "Professionalism is nondemocratic in that it appeals to political values other than
those of popular sovereignty to legitimate its authority." Peer review of teaching (e.g.,
Haefele 1992) is a case in point. Civil rights activists may not want teachers to have virtually
unlimited autonomy in the classroom. Bob Peterson (1997: 4) explained, "A potential
problem with the strictly professional union approach [to accountability] . . . in many urban
districts has distinct racial overtones. Is peer evaluation the exclusive province of teachers
and administrators or should parents and community members play a role?" Especially as
the teaching force's demographics diverges from those of students and parents (Justiz and
Kameen 1988), relying on professional-only evaluation may insult parents of a school who
expect a role in school governance. Having an expertise-based evaluation system conflicts
with U.S. traditions of democratic control, upon which civil rights activists have based
advocacy of school governance councils. Some critics of standardized testing, such as
Wilson (1996), point to British school inspections as an alternative to statistical
accountability. The heart of the British inspection system, however, was until recently a
self-perpetuating corporate body selected by and from experienced teachers. One may (as
Wilson did) use school inspection to point out the problems in high-stakes accountability.
One may not, however, successfully import the insular assumptions of professionalism to
late 20th United States public schooling.
     Professionalism is the dominant alternative to standardized-test-based accountability.
Other critics of standardized testing-based accountability may not be as explicit as Wise in
their advocacy of professionalism, and they may not agree with his proposals to limit entry
into high-status positions in teaching. Still, they argue for more decision-making power in
the classroom and school and see the bureaucratization and centralization of authority as one
of the reasons why standardized testing is flawed. Thus, Kenneth Peterson (1995: 4) argues
that one of the key principles in teacher evaluation should be to "place the teacher at the
center of evaluation activity." In that respect, the professionalism label is a useful heuristic
device for understanding opposition to standardized testing. Despite its intriguing hypothesis
(that status and autonomy are the key to educational reform), professionalism is unlikely to
supplant high-stakes accountability because it is politically untenable.
     Moreover, professionalism addresses primarily concerns inside schools (autonomy of
teachers). Publicly, professionalism only changes the superficial aspect of teacher status, not
the public dissatisfaction and disconnection which schools face more broadly. Several
historical changes have fragmented what is supposedly a common public commitment to
education. The aging of the population since the height of the baby boom has shrunk the
political power of parents. In addition, the civil rights movement and a political coalition of
fundamentalist Protestant organizations have stripped school officials of any broad political
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consensus. Finally, the fragmentation of urban politics and suburban growth has encouraged
continued racial and class segregation (albeit in new forms), making common interests in
broad school policies difficult (Katznelson and Weir 1985). While I doubt professionalism's
proponents would ever claim that it is a panacea, they have nonetheless pinned their hopes
for dramatic school reform on a model that would not solve the major problems of school
politics today. 
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The Ground We Stand on
     Like the expansion of Israeli settlements in occupied territories, the continuing spread of
standardized testing has created "facts on the ground" which have transformed both schools
and the politics of education. To ignore the educational landscape around us, or to wish it
would go away, is unproductive. Those who disagree with the assumptions of high-stakes,
testing-based accountability must acknowledge that standardized testing is likely to become
even more prominent in the short-term. This understanding should not prevent advocates
from fighting the trend where possible. Local victories against high-stakes testing are
important both to the children involved and also as a standing alternative to technocratic
accountability. Nevertheless, we should see clearly what is and is not possible in the
near-term future. 
The Future Growth of Standardized Testing
     Standardized testing connected with high-stakes accountability systems is likely to
become more prominent in the next five years in the majority of states. The Education
Commission of the States (1997) recently reported that almost half of all states have
implemented or are planning public accountability systems using statistical measures. Some
additional states may use the national tests advocated by President Clinton (if the tests exist).
Some like Tennessee will design their own accountability mechanisms. Others like New
Jersey will create a set of content standards with the promise of new tests and accountability
tied to the content standards. The federal government and states will then spend millions of
dollars developing tests, field-testing them, and supporting their use. In the meantime,
popular news sources will continue to report annually the average SAT scores and tests
currently used in local jurisdictions. Within five to ten years, some states will begin the
mandated use of exams replacing or supplanting current off-the-shelf commercial tests.
     Moreover, the political debate over tests is likely to center around the federal relationship
between Washington and the states or (with privatization) public oversight of private
schooling. For the duration of President Clinton's term, the administration is likely to
support national tests, and governors who dissent (like Virginia's outgoing Governor George
Allen) will do so not because they disagree with high-stakes tests but because they wish
states to design their own independent standards. If federal courts, using Agostini v. Felton
(1997), allow tuition voucher programs to proceed, state legislatures may contemplate
mandatory use of high-stakes testing for private schools accepting public funds. The debate
would then shift to public control of private educational institutions. A vision of the future
debate may be Ohio Association of Independent Schools v. Goff (1996), in which a federal
appeals-court panel concluded that Ohio's requirement to test private school students was
constitutional. Those who disagree with all high-stakes testing will be at the margins of
debate in the near future, except where they make alliances with others (as in the
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Congressional fight over national tests).
Limits on High-Stakes Testing
     High-stakes testing has some significant weaknesses, despite the near-term growth we
can expect. Some of the same dynamics which have limited the accountability use of
performance-based, open-form testing will also shape standardized testing. Simply put,
developing tests is expensive. The Tennessee legislature recently delayed the
implementation of new subject tests for high school students to use in the value-added
statistical system because, according to the bill's sponsor, the state could not afford the $10
million development cost (Educational Improvement Act Amendments 1997; Finn 1997). In
addition, political adversaries may well use the management and pedagogical problems of
new testing and accountability systems as a pawn in broader partisan battles. California's
recent educational history is a case in point. Questions about the utility and propriety of
performance-based tests combined with the expense of development and testing to kill the
California Learning Assessment System. The governor, state superintendent, and legislature
at the time were at odds over the purpose of the system, and that political conflict fed a
controversy started by conservative critics over the ideological content of the tests, dooming
the largest experiment in performance-based accountability to date (Kirst 1996; McDonnell
1997). Observers of merit pay have noted that political dynamics involving fairness and
incentives to cheat typically kill merit pay systems (e.g., Glass 1990). The same may happen
to the next generation of high-stakes accountability.
Contraction of the Meaning of "Public"
     Despite the weaknesses of high-stakes testing, the short-term consequence of more
standardized testing may be intensified criticism of public schooling and cynicism about the
purposes of public educational systems. Schools need to be "public" in the sense of public
involvement and political commitment (Fine 1991: Chap. 9; Katz 1992). However, the
ranking of schools and teachers is inherently a zero-sum game, and not everyone can be
above-average. Seeing school performance in such terms, divorced from classroom practice
and public policy, makes both meaningful praise and criticism of schools very difficult. 
Moreover, the constant reinforcement of the myth of declining school performance will
continue the erosion of support for the good schools that exist and make intense discussion
of the needs of children more difficult. 
Return to Table of Contents
Where To Go
     Some alternative models of accountability may reverse the destructive tendencies of
statistical accountability systems, both in political and practice terms. Reconstructing public
education in its best sense (schooling for children, their families, and the public) requires
connecting schools in a meaningful and explicitly political way with broader communities.
In the same way that the development of the Central Park East elementary and secondary
schools under Deborah Meier's leadership required both bureaucratic support and political
connections to survive and thrive (Fliegel 1993; Meier 1995), so other schools and school
critics dissenting from the current accountability trend must craft an alternative support
structure, both within and extending beyond public schooling. Sizer (1992) argues for
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opening up schools to external evaluation for pedagogical reasons, to keep teachers in touch
with reasonable expectations of what students should do. In addition, allowing friendly
critics into schools serves an explicitly political purpose, giving community members a
concrete sense of what happens in schools. No statistics can substitute for the type of
immediate contact such external evaluation provides. 
     Permitting external evaluation is difficult today. Allowing strangers into schools is
threatening because it erodes, at least on a symbolic level, the commitment to professional
autonomy which administrators have maintained for almost one hundred years. In practical
terms, it requires balancing the legitimate needs of teachers for enough time to plan and try
out ideas against the interests of parents and the public to know what is happening in
schools. In systems where many teachers may be from ethnic and racial groups different
from their students, the tension between teachers and parents may be real, and letting parents
into evaluation may be politically tricky (B. Peterson 1997). Yet educators must
acknowledge the need to move beyond professionalism as the primary route to support for
public schools. Isolating the workings of schools from the public has done teachers and
administrators a disservice in the long term as professionalism has declined as a successful
route to status and autonomy. 
     External community evaluation is not the only conceivable way of crafting alternatives to
high-stakes standardized test accountability. Others might meet the same needs (e.g.,
Bernauer and Cress 1997). Common to solving the political problems of accountability are
the following three requirements:
Accountability should encourage deeper discussion of educational problems. Student
performance should be the starting point of educational politics, not an occasion for
political opportunism or crude comparisons. Statistical accountability, with the
centralization of statistical production and dissemination through popular news
sources, encourages oversimplification rather than a more extensive public discussion.
 
Accountability should connect student performance with classroom practice.
Statistical accountability, with the abstraction of student performance into numbers
without context, removes classroom practices from the discussion of educational
reform.
 
Accountability should make the interests of all children common. This sense of
commonality is the best meaning of "public" in public schooling. Statistical
accountability systems intensify educational triage, encouraging schools to isolate and
devote fewer resources to students whom schools judge as difficult to teach.
Politically, statistical accountability systems divide the interests of schools and
communities through competition for prestige and resources. 
No one should pretend that accountability is without conflict or unproblematic. We should
face those conflicts and issues directly, however, instead of hiding behind existing
standardized testing. Some parents and others may well see statistical comparisons as a
primary way for them to gauge school programs and children's education, or as a way to
advance specific interests. For example, parents of students with disabilities and disability
advocates face real quandaries over accountability. On the one hand, high-stakes testing has
created incentives for segregating students (McGill-Franzen and Allington 1993). On the
other hand, the national rhetoric emphasizing achievement for all students has provided a 
lever to criticize the omission of students with disabilities from assessment systems, to craft
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new federal law encouraging inclusion in assessment, and to create guidelines for state
officials seeking to change assessment practices (Thurlow, Elliott, Ysseldyke, and Erickson
1996; also visit the National Center on Educational Outcomes site at
http://www.coled.umn.edu/NCEO/). This dilemma is rooted in the tension between wanting
to protect students with disabilities from the deleterious consequences of high-stakes testing
and yet also wanting whatever accountability systems exist to pay attention to their interests.
Those criticizing statistical accountability systems must understand this and similar
dilemmas of parents and advocates. Changing attitudes and assumptions, while protecting
what many see as important in statistical accountability, requires modeling of worthwhile
alternatives and small-scale demonstrations that are explicitly political. Over time, if not
immediately, schools need a plausible, fair way to evaluate school improvement. With
enough local models of alternative accountability, then perhaps the dynamics of educational
politics at state and national levels can change to become broader, connect with classroom
practices, and require more than sound bites. Without those concrete examples, however, the
domination of crude statistical evaluation of schools will continue, to the detriment of
schools, children, their families, and the public.
Return to Table of Contents
Acknowledgements
     I am indebted to Gene Glass and anonymous reviewers at Education Policy Analysis 
Archives, Brian Balogh, Douglas Fuchs, and the students in my masters history of education
class for contributions to my thinking about this subject. I am solely responsible, of course,
for the interpretations here and the accuracy of detail.
Notes
I mean by standardized tests those administered in whole-group settings with
quantifiable results. These include multiple-choice tests and also performance-based
tests whose results are reportable in quantifiable terms. Thus, Advanced Placement
exams conducted by Educational Testing Service are standardized tests for the
purposes of this article because, even though parts of the test are performance-based
(such as essays), the essays are scored by a quantifiable rubric system and the whole
test reported on the company's 1-5 scale for such tests. Moreover, reporting scores by
numbers allows the simplified public discussion which is my focus here. For an
introduction to Lauren Resnick's advocacy of measurement-driven reform, see
Simmons and Resnick (1993). For issues involved in Kentucky and Arizona
(respectively), see Jones and Whitford (1997) and Noble and Smith (1994). 
 
1.
An anonymous reviewer noted that the line between practice and political legacies is
fuzzy. In many ways, the debates over census undercounting and the consumer price
index are also debates about the political rhetoric of the reapportionment process and
future support for government entitlement programs. Nonetheless, the distinction
between the two legacies is a useful heuristic device for explaining why the literature
on perverse incentives of high-stakes testing does not address the critical issue of
school politics.
 
2.
According to the Vanderbilt Television News Archives, the following broadcasts
discussed standardized test score levels between 1968 and 1987: October 28, 1975
3.
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(ABC, CBS); November 17, 1975 (CBS); August 23, 1977 (ABC, CBS); August 24,
1977 (ABC, commentary); September 1, 1977 (CBS, commentary); September 21,
1982 (CBS); September 19, 1984 (ABC); January 9, 1985 (NBC); January 26, 1985
(CBS, NBC); September 22, 1987 (NBC). The search terms included "standardized
and test*," "test and scor*," "SAT and scor*," and "SAT and (college or scholastic)."
Excluded from this list are stories about the alleged discriminatory nature of tests.
 
I agree with Stedman (1996a, 1996b) that schools are not as good as they should be.
Those problems do not mean the myth of declining quality is true: schools have been
inconsistent and too often mediocre for many years.
4.
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  Search as one may, one encounters redundant libraries of treatises and guides
on test uses and even misuses--including uses in policy. I had searched in vain for a
critical, contextualized, discussion of high-stakes testing. It seemed merely to be an
accepted fact of life. A critical reading of the history and distortions of
accountability-as-performance-testing apparently did not exist, until the appearance
of this article. Sherman Dorn has done education a good turn with his analyses in
"The Political Legacy of School Accountability Systems." Special virtues in this
piece include Dorn's clear-headedness about professionalism, sensitivity toward the
history and formation of educational discourse, the importance of community
context and diversity, and, generally, a steadfast refusal to see in history an
inevitable progress.
  Dorn's work will be especially helpful in the preparation of an article about
accountability in the rural context, which a colleague and I are just beginning.
Accountability, it seems, is needed because schools have become so remote from
their publics, and the social construction known as the public is itself losing
coherence. Rural schools are allegedly very close to their "communities" (their
public). Widespread evidence for this claim is much thinner than one would suspect,
but in most rural schools, faculty and staff are nearly all local people who interact
continually with one another in social and civic encounters outside the school walls.
Perhaps this sort of informal phenomenon is what constitutes the oversight for which
accountability schemes are intended (unconsciously, of course, in the minds of the
framers of such schemes) to substitute. If this is so, the substitution is particularly
unsuited to the terrain of rural existence.
  Dorn is especially to be thanked, as well, for not demonizing tests.
Standardized, norm-referenced tests are both the products, and the poor innocent
victims of the technocratic worldview. They are not going away anytime soon, and
they can be theoretically helpful in understanding the pattern of a child's
accomplishments. Dorn notes the utility of some of these tests for parents of special
needs kids; the truth is that most parents could profitably take a similar interest and
discover a similar utility. Most teachers of my acquaintance do not, however, find
aggregate classroom or school results particularly helpful. They understand the game
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and they are cynical, widely.
  The one usage for which norm-referenced tests, among the gamut of all
"standardized" instruments, exhibit wondrous utility is quantitative research. But, of
course, bureaucrats, politicians, and government functionaries (a.k.a. "policy
makers") have even less respect for researchers than for teachers. More's the pity; but
this is a very useful article for those with the institutional leisure to write and think
about schools. 
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 Sherman Dorn presents compelling reasons why we must attend to the
political legacy of educational reform when thinking about the pros and cons of
national school achievement tests. He emphasizes the ambiguities that surround the
targets for accountability: public schools as institutions, teachers and school
administrators, students, public policy, etc., many of which cannot be well served by
a single index.
  Dorn's case is bolstered substantially by a case study of the (failed) efforts in
Great Britain, following the passage of the Education Reform Act of 1988, to
establish mandatory national tests (see Black, 1994). Recently, I have argued that we
are failing to adequately consider the lessons from Britain and from other sources as
the nation continues to move towards a program for national testing (Jones, 1997a,
1997b). 
  Dorn reminds us that an apparently objective notion of a statistical
accountability system serves to divert discussion from the purposes of schools and
the means by which those purposes may be fulfilled. He correctly concludes that
there is high risk that "the domination of crude statistical evaluation of schools will
continue, to the detriment of schools, children, their families, and the public." 
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